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Oct 6 2010
Exactly what will change if the UK adopts the Alternative Vote (AV) system in next May’s
referendum? Reformers argue that AV removes any need for large numbers of voters to
choose to vote tactically, rather than supporting their top preference party. But social
science theory insists that tactical voting can occur under all voting systems, although
showing up in different ways. Rafael Hortala-Vallve makes clear that AV will probably cut
the incidence of tactical voting, but cannot get rid of it altogether.
Tactical voting denotes any situation where voters can improve their welfare (get a better outcome, given
their preferences) by supporting a party that is not their top preference, that is by voting ‘insincerely’ for a
party that is lower down their preference ranking but has more chance of winning, or defeating a strongly
disliked opposing party. Under first past the post elections at present, of course, many voters are forced to
vote tactically so as to avoid their votes being ‘wasted’.
This blog has seen a lively debate on whether tactical voting would continue if Britain votes to adopt the
Australian system of Alternative Vote in the May 2011 referendum – see comments on earlier posts by Roger
Mortimore, Andy White, and myself. Luckily, there is no disagreement amongst us that tactical voting remains
a theoretical possibility under AV. Instead the disagreement focuses on whether tactical voting is at all likely
in future UK elections held under AV. With the following example I’ll show that tactical voting may indeed be
less likely under AV than under FPTP, but it is still a very likely event.
Before doing so I want to make sure we all agree on what is tactical voting (also called strategic voting,
rather confusingly). A player (in the game-theory sense) acts strategically when he acts to maximize his own
utility, while taking into account all other players’ actions. In a voting situation being strategic implies (1)
taking into account the expected votes of other citizens, and (2) voting for the party  that maximises expected
utility (i.e. utility times the probability that the individual’s vote is pivotal). Note that often (indeed usually) a
strategic vote may also coincide with supporting the party that is most preferred by the player. However, a
sincere voter will stick with voting their top preference even if this produces a poorer result for them. In this
post I will say that a voter is tactical when s/he is strategic and s/he is not voting her/his top preference.
First Past the Post
A typical constituency that displays tactical voting under FPTP is one where there is a progressive majority
but the Conservatives have plurality support. (Alternatively, we could think of a constituency with a
conservative majority but with plurality support towards a progressive party).
As an example think of the following preferences in the population:
35% Labour, 25% Liberal Democrats and 40% Tories.
In some circumstances we may observe the supporters of one of the progressive parties voting tactically in
order to avoid a Tory candidate. In the previous example, some Liberal Democrat supporters may vote for
the Labour candidate to ensure that the Tories do not win. In a way, the tactical vote does what the voting
rule cannot do: it allows a majority of citizens to select a candidate that is preferred by them.
Alternative Vote
Let’s now analyse what would happen under AV. Some at least of the Tory supporters know that, once
second preferences are taken into account, it is impossible for them to win (because there is a progressive
majority in the constituency). However, they can try to influence which progressive candidate is elected. They
especially want to do so when the progressive candidate that has most support among progressive citizens
is the one they most dislike.
Suppose then that the second and third preferences in the previous example are set up in the
following highly simplified way:
35% of voters prefer Labour to LibDem, and then LibDem to Tory
25% prefer LibDem to Labour, and then Labour to Tory
40% prefer Tory to LibDem, and then LibDem to Labour
In the above example, under the Alternative Vote sincere voting by everyone will elect a Labour candidate. 
However, some of the Tory voters could act strategically by marking the Liberal Democrat candidate as their
first preference, and the Conservatives second. If 11 per cent of voters follow this course of action, the Tory
candidate is eliminated under AV, the Liberal Democrat candidate is elected in a run-off against Labour.
Notice here that the tactical vote of relatively few citizens (11 per cent) makes a majority (65 per cent) of all
citizens better off than if everyone votes sincerely!
On strategic voting
So tactical voting is indeed a possibility under both electoral rules. However, the citizens that act tactically
are not the same. In my example, under FPTP the Liberal Democrat supporters vote tactically, but under AV
some of the Tory voters vote tactically. When there is a progressive majority but a conservative party has
plurality support, then there is always scope for tactical voting under FPTP. The same thing applies in
reverse if there is a locally conservative majority of Tory and Liberal Democrat supporters (as there may be
under the current coalition government) but Labour has the largest single vote, hence the intense discussion
of electoral pacts at the recent Tory conference fringe. Under AV, however, there will only be tactical voting
when supporters of the party with plurality support prefers a centrist candidate that would not be elected
unless the run-off stage is altered to include them.
It follows that tactical voting is less likely to occur under AV. In addition, social science research has also
shown that voters are less likely to act strategically with voting rules that are more complex. Now  AV is
slightly more complicated than FPTP, and so recent work shows that we should expect less tactical voting
here. However, there is also evidence of a different kind that the amount of tactical voting in proportional
representation (PR) systems and FPTP systems is surprisingly similar. This effect occurs because the
number of parties is mostly higher in PR systems  (i.e. it is endogenous to the vote counting process being
used). With more small parties in PR systems, the opportunities for voters to behave tactically increase (see
Abramson et al, 2010). The number of parties in Britain is likely to rise somewhat under AV, so this will offset
the effects above.
Notice also that tactical voting under AV may not only be observed by manipulating preference transfers or
second preferences, which requires a high level of precision in knowing citizens’ preferences (as recent
posts on this blog by Roger Mortimore or Andy White) have argued. It may instead be observed by directly
manipulating the person that gets first preferences. Tactical voting of this second kind only requires the sort
of information that is needed under FPTP.
Finally, I’d like to emphasise that tactical voting may not be that bad a thing. In my example above, tactical
voting has allowed the selection of  a candidate that is preferred by a majority of citizens. It would be difficult
to disagree with the wish of finding electoral rules that are not manipulable -such manipulations do usually
benefit those who are better at computing the best strategy or those who have better information. In most
circumstances it allows voters to achieve overcome the limitations of the voting rule and achieve an outcome
that is better for them.
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